A Game Change in Syria: Is Assad to Stay?


After more than two years of a devastating conflict, the balance of power in Syria is gradually shifting in favor of the Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad. Needless to say, this scenario seemed quite implausible at the beginning of the Damascus Spring and further into the civil war. Why the rebels failed to consolidate their efforts at ousting Assad is a critical question. One might reasonably argue that the unconcerted policies of Washington and Brussels toward Damascus fell woefully short of the desired expectations that the Assad regime would yield to foreign and internal pressure. But a more important question concerns the role which Russia played in this geopolitical game and the benefits that Russia will obtain should Vladimir Putin continue to augment Assad’s victories over the rebels.

The rebellion against the rule of Bashar al-Assad in Syria was patterned after the uprisings in other Arab states and began in March 2011, in Deraa. The idiosyncrasies of the Syrian regime, and especially its aggressive posture vis-à-vis the West, caused an outcome radically different from those of Tunisia, Egypt, or Yemen. The Syrian strife followed a path akin to Libya’s, where Muammar Gaddafi declared a war against his people and was subsequently toppled as a result of a foreign intervention. In the case of Syria, however, such an intervention has so far appeared impossible.

As the violence in Syria escalated, a regional conflict morphed into an issue of international concern. Russia, Iran, Lebanon’s Hizbullah, and China offered support for the Assad regime. The so-called “Friends of Syria,” including Gulf states, Jordan, Turkey, the European Union, and the United States, took the side of the Syrian opposition. As a result of irrevocable differences among world powers, the Assad regime was allowed to continue its struggle for survival. It is no surprise, however, that the regime of Bashar al-Assad found support among Russia (particularly) and China.

Undoubtedly, Russia’s stance on Syria has been actuated by antagonism towards U.S. duplicitous foreign policy in the Middle East, its success in toppling Gaddafi, and its goals of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad who is seen as Russia’s last military ally in the Middle East. The Syrian rebellion has thus been perceived by Moscow and Beijing as another coup d’état orchestrated by the West and the petromonarchies. And inasmuch as the NATO operation in Libya overtly violated the UN agreements, taking advantage of their votes in the Security Council, Russia and China nixed the resolutions on Syria.

It could be argued that Russia’s efforts to forestall Western efforts at regime change in Damascus have been critical to Assad’s survival. Whether it is a matter of mere luck or a set of independent variables, we cannot yet ascertain. But given that the U.S., Turkey, and Israel sent their envoys to Moscow for talks on Syria, the most brutal phase of the conflict looks set to be drawing to a close. One of the lessons we should learn from this is that international politics is undergoing a transformation, and Russia certainly wants to be shaping the new world order on a par with China and some other nondemocratic regimes. In the end, if the regime of Bashar al-Assad wins, the nondemocratic world will have a reason to celebrate.

Germany and Russia: An Inevitable Partnership?

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Vladimir Putin shake hands in Hanover, Germany, April 7 

Looking back into the history of world politics, one can explore a number of instances when foes turned into allies, and the Russo-German partnership in the 21st century is a quintessential example. Although Russia and Germany share a woeful period of their histories, these countries no longer treat each other as adversaries, at least on political level. Russia’s eternal president, Vladimir Putin, in fact has a very intricate relationship with Germany. Once a Soviet spy working in Dresden, Eastern Germany, Putin looked upon German hard-working lifestyle and diligence with admiration. Several Russian publicists argued that Putin’s Russia is a reflection of the KGB agent’s ideal of social utopia he once beheld in socialist Germany.

What brings Berlin and Moscow together? Is Germany more important for Russia or vice versa? The countries share common economic interests and regional ambitions. Both Russia and Germany tend to dominate regional politics, inasmuch as Merkel and Putin have made their countries economic locomotives in the European Union and Eurasia, respectively. Without Russia, Germany might not be able to provide for EU energy security in a long-term perspective.  Without Germany, Russia loses leverage over European political agenda, and the perennial criticism of the Putin regime in the PACE is an example of the EU’s general attitude towards the Kremlin. Through cooperation with Berlin, Putin also seeks to attract German investments to the extractive economy of Russia. The relationship between Germany and Russia is critical to both countries, but for the latter it is even more so. The European Union (particularly Germany, France, and Holland) is Russia’s main economic partner and Euro bonds constitute a significant amount of Russia’s financial resources.

Yet, no matter how hard Putin will try to forge closer political ties with Germany, his efforts are fruitless. Although Merkel does not publicly criticize the Putin regime for human rights abuses and corruption, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle and several other German politicians have never hidden their aversion to the regime. Therefore, in the case of Merkel’s defeat in the next parliamentary elections, Putin may lose his last European friend among Western powers.

Vladimir Putin’s Visit to Hanover, April 7, 2013

http://echo.msk.ru

http://echo.msk.ru

http://echo.msk.ru

Alas, even though German public opinion is against Putin, during their meeting in Hanover Frau Merkel will not reprimand her friend Vladimir for his political terror in Russia. Lamentably, national interests oftentimes prevail over morale.

Some thoughts on Central Asia

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Islam Karimov, president of Uzbekistan

Not too long ago the world witnessed the demise of Hugo Chavez, one of Latin America’s most idiosyncratic dictators. Although the regime of Chavez was by and large authoritarian and exhibited a great deal of intransigence toward the opposition, the electoral processes in Venezuela have not been jettisoned after all. With Chavez gone, the new leader of Venezuela will emerge after elections, be it Henrique Capriles or Chavez’s protégé. 

A 75-year-old dictator of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, in power since 1991, might soon face Chavez’s fate. A recent news report stated that president Karimov has suffered a heart stroke and his health condition is deteriorating. Rumors have been circulating for a while now that president’s Western-educated daughter, Gulnara Karimova, might succeed her father. But given social discontent with corruption and cronyism of the Karimov regime, such a succession is unlikely to flow smoothly. Because Karimov has cared more about security of his regime rather than the well-being of his people, the future of Uzbekistan’s political system without Karimov is indeed worrisome.

Notwithstanding all the negative traits of the Uzbek dictator, Central Asia became a more stable region due to his efforts at fighting terrorism. Karimov also played an important role in putting an end to the Civil War in Tajikistan, defending the neo-Soviet regime of Rakhmonov on a par with Russia. But Karimov’s efforts at eliminating the opposition bereft Uzbekistan of sturdy democratic institutions. Without them, Uzbekistan is likely to become enmeshed in political chaos should the dictator decease any time soon. 

 

Nations fail because…

“Why Nations Fail:The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty” by D.Acemoglu & J. Robinson (photo credit: bernardleong.com)

This book by Daren Acemoglu (MIT) and James Robinson (Harvard) was suggested for home reading in our “Civil Wars” class at Josef Korbel School. As an International Studies student, I found the arguments made in the book quite germane to the general discourse on the North-South relations, and international relations in particular.

Published in 2012, “Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty” is a book that deserves due attention. Several book reviews containing harsh critique of the book by and large failed to repudiate Acemoglu and Robinson’s argument about the roots of failure in state building (see, for example, Jeffrey D. Sach’s review in Foreign Affairs and the authors’ ensuing response). Acemoglu and Robinson argue that states fail because of extractive political institutions, which forestall economic progress and bring a host of problems to their populace and adjacent states alike. The authors provide a historical overview of the establishment of political institutions throughout the world, noting, inter alia, that neither “geography” hypothesis of inequality nor “culture” and “ignorance” hypotheses work are good at explaining reasons behind poverty. Drawing on the case of the Korean Peninsula, the authors argue that it is difference in institutions that divides the nation. Problems in African countries are also caused by the absence of inclusive political and economic institutions that are necessary for establishing sturdy governance, which would pave the way for economic development.

The main question that remained unclear after reading the book: if inclusive political institutions are a sine-qua-non for economic advance, how did countries like petro-monarchies in the Middle East achieve formidable progress in developing various sectors of economy [without] inclusive institutions? The theory presented by Acemoglu and Robinson is rather plausible in explaining why failed states struggle to give way to economic growth, but does not answer the question why some states are/were economically prosperous, but lack/lacked inclusive institutions (Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Peru and the like). Overall, this book is a worthy read for everyone interested in global problems and ways to solve them.

What the “Magnitsky Act” means to all of us

Photograph Credit | Hermitage Capital Management/AFP

Last Friday, November 16, the U.S. House of Representatives voted unanimously for the adoption of the “Magnitsky Act,” which is designed to punish the Russian officials implicated in the death of a prominent lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky. This is great news for all of us who believe in justice and the rule of law. But it is also bad news for the Kremlin, which has nothing to offer but accusations of meddling in Russia’s internal affairs.

3 years ago, Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer working for the Hermitage Capital Management Fund in Moscow, uncovered a large tax refund fraud ($230 million) committed by several Russian officials closely affiliated with the senior leadership of Russia. After publicly testifying about the crime, Sergei was consequently arrested on false charges, tortured for 358 days and died in jail on November 16, 2009, after being severely beaten and denied required medicine. After the details of Magnitsky’s murder and the tax fraud became known to the public, the Russian government responded to accusations by opening a case to prosecute Sergei Magnitsky, 20 months after he was killed. The Russian Ministry of the Interior accused Magnitsky of the above-mentioned embezzlement, thus seeking to posthumously besmirch Sergei’s reputation. Until today, Sergei’s mother has been trying to fight the corrupt Russian judicial system and exculpate her son – but so far in vain.

The “Magnitsky Act” is a warning sign to a host of corrupt Russian officials at the top echelons of political and judicial power, who continue to perpetrate repression against anyone who disagrees with the Kremlin’s policies. While the economy, education, and democratic institutions are faltering in Russia, the highest-ranking officials, including country’s chief federal investigator and the members of the “United Russia” party, are buying property in the European countries, the United States, and elsewhere. For this reason, Western countries must be resolute in their preference to penalize human rights abusers and criminals despite their high-ranking status at least in their countries, and the “Magnitsky Act” is a shift in the right direction.

To learn more about Sergei Magnitsky’s death and his investigation, watch this video:

Anything But Ordinary

I am sure that some of the Korbel students might have seen the post about Korbel professor Oliver Kaplan’s article in The New York Times on our school’s facebook page this morning. Isn’t it amazing to come across Korbel professors’ articles published in various renowned academic journals and newspapers? Indeed… But why is this important, you might ask? Well, because Dr. Kaplan’s “Human Rights and Foreign Policy” class, like other Korbel courses, is anything but ordinary.

Have you ever thought about the relation between erstwhile UN Ambassador Kirkpatrick‘s foreign policy objectives and those of Mitt Romney? Well, Jeane Kirkpatrick spoke in favor of a deeper military engagement with abusive, albeit staunch, U.S. allies and a belligerent policy toward countries, which dared to challenge U.S. hegemony; with regard to countries like China and Russia, Mitt Romney, to all appearances, would pursue a policy akin to Kirkpatrick’s ideas, if he became president. Topics like that. And now onto the most exciting thing, I know many Korbel students like it: “Human Rights and Foreign Policy” class involves… STATS! I know how excited many of our students get after hearing the word. However, aside from difficulties entailed in statistics, I deem quantitative analysis a great research tool, and an important skill every aspiring International Relations scholar should master in graduate school.

Ad astra per Korbel.

Thanks for reading,

Dennis Burakov

M.A., International Studies